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The U.S. experience with national prohibition of alcohol plays a frequent role in discussions 
of government policy toward alcohol, drugs and other commodities.  Central to this debate is 
whether, or to what degree, Prohibition reduced consumption of alcohol.  Data on alcohol 
consumption are not available for the Prohibition period, however, so numerous authors have 
used the cirrhosis death rate to infer the behavior of alcohol consumption.    Focusing on 
comparisons of the pre-Prohibition and early Prohibition periods, these authors have suggested 
that Prohibition caused as much as a 50% decline in cirrhosis.
1     
Existing analyses of Prohibition and cirrhosis are potentially problematic, however.  Most 
analyses have focused on the univariate behavior of cirrhosis and conducted simple comparisons 
of the pre-Prohibition and Prohibition periods.  This approach ignores other Prohibition-era 
changes in alcohol-control policies, including state prohibitions, wartime prohibition, and 
increased alcohol taxation.  Likewise, the univariate approach fails to account for the many non-
policy variables that might affect cirrhosis, including social attitudes, income, war, and 
demographics. 
This paper evaluates the impact of Prohibition on cirrhosis death rates, and it considers the 
possible implications for understanding the effects of prohibitions generally.     
Section 2 re-examines the relation between cirrhosis and alcohol consumption.   Both bio-
medical research and comparisons across countries or time periods suggest alcohol consumption 
is an important determinant of cirrhosis.  Using cirrhosis to infer Prohibition’s impact on alcohol 
consumption, however, assumes that short-term fluctuations in cirrhosis are reasonable proxies  
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for short-term fluctuations in alcohol consumption.  We document that the time-series variation 
in alcohol consumption explains much of the time-series variation in cirrhosis, but the relation is 
far from perfect.   More importantly, various aspects of the relation need to be accounted for if 
the behavior of cirrhosis is to suggest conclusions about alcohol consumption. 
Section 3 begins our examination of Prohibition’s impact on cirrhosis. We show that 
cirrhosis was lower during Prohibition than in most years before or after, which makes a prima 
facie case that Prohibition reduced cirrhosis.   Further examination, however, suggests caution in 
drawing this conclusion.   First, there have been substantial fluctuations in cirrhosis outside the 
Prohibition period, which suggests that factors other than Prohibition should be considered 
before concluding that Prohibition caused the low level during Prohibition.  Second, cirrhosis did 
not jump dramatically upon repeal of Prohibition, which fails to suggest an important effect of 
Prohibition.    Most importantly, cirrhosis had fallen to its low, Prohibition level by the time 
Prohibition began, which means Prohibition did not cause the low level of cirrhosis at the 
beginning of Prohibition. 
Section 4 then presents regressions of state-level cirrhosis death rates on measures of 
state prohibition, constitutional prohibition, and other variables.   These regressions suggest that 
state-level prohibition had only a small impact on cirrhosis; instead, one or more aggregate 
factors caused a major decline in cirrhosis during the 1917-1919 period.  Pre-1920 federal anti-
alcohol policies might have contributed to this decline, but other factors were likely important 
influences as well.    Whatever caused the pre-1920 decline, constitutional Prohibition lowered 
the cirrhosis death rate by about 10-20%. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
1 See, for example, Aaron and Musto (1981), Moore and Gerstein (1981), Edwards et al. (1994), 
Musto (1996), MacCoun and Reuter (2001), and Yoon et. al (2001).    
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Section 5 discusses possible implications of the results. 
2. The Relation between Alcohol Consumption and Cirrhosis 
As noted above, most literature on the relation between Alcohol Prohibition and alcohol 
consumption uses cirrhosis death rates as a proxy for alcohol consumption.
2   No one doubts that 
cirrhosis is a reasonable indicator of alcohol consumption in many contexts: extensive bio-
medical evidence concludes that alcohol consumption causes most cirrhosis (e.g., Berkow (1992, 
pp. 890-897)).  Whether cirrhosis is a useful proxy in all settings, however, depends on specific 
aspects of the relation between consumption and cirrhosis.  In this section we examine data on 
alcohol consumption and cirrhosis, with particular attention to the aspects of this relation 
relevant to the study of Prohibition. 
Figure 1 presents cross-country evidence on the relation between cirrhosis and alcohol 
consumption.  The figure plots the average cirrhosis death rate against average alcohol 
consumption per capita over roughly the period 1954-1995 for sixteen countries.
3  The cirrhosis 
death rates are measured as the number of cirrhosis deaths per 100,000 persons; thus, they are 
                                                      
2 Other proxy series include the drunkenness arrest rate, deaths from alcoholism, admittances to 
mental hospitals for alcoholic psychosis, industrial efficiency, the industrial accident rate, and 
the automobile accident rate; see, in particular, Warburton (1932).  Additional work on the 
determinants of alcohol consumption uses cirrhosis as a proxy outside the Prohibition period, 
since state-level data on alcohol consumption do not exist.  See, for example, Cook (1981) or 
Cook and Tauchen (1982). 
 
3 The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 




crude rather than age-adjusted death rates.
4  The alcohol consumption data are measured in pure 
liters of alcohol per capita, computed as the alcohol-adjusted sum of beer, wine, and spirits.
5  
The data in the figure display a strong, positive correlation between average alcohol 
consumption and average cirrhosis death rates; the estimated correlation is 0.75, which is 
significant at the 0.001 level.    The correlation is far from perfect, however.  For example, 
Austria, Italy and Hungary appear to be outliers.  More importantly, the fact that the levels of the 
two variables are correlated on average is not sufficient to justify using cirrhosis for the time-
series analysis considered below.   
Figures 2a and 2b present the annual time-series data on cirrhosis and consumption that 
underlie the averages for the sixteen countries. The data are consistent with a positive effect of 
alcohol consumption on cirrhosis, but the evidence is far from overwhelming.  In several 
countries the correlation is consistently positive, and this occurs with respect to both increases 
and decreases in cirrhosis (e.g., Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and the U.S.).   In several other countries the correlation is positive, but this mainly 
reflects a common upward trend over the sample period (e.g., Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hungary, U.K., and Ireland).   And in many countries, there is substantial variation in 
cirrhosis that is not present in alcohol consumption.  In some cases this variation has the 
                                                      
4 Age-adjusted death rates are not available for most countries.   We provide a crude correction 
for changes in the age composition of the population in the regression analysis below.  Cirrhosis 
death rates are from the World Health Organization’s World Health Statistics Annual, various 
years. 
 
5 The consumption data are from Brewers Association of Canada (1997), except that those for 
the U.S. are from Miron (1996).  Per capita consumption of absolute alcohol is calculated using 
the average percentage of alcohol in beer, wine, and spirits in a given country in a given year.  
Generally these percentages are 4.5-5% for beer, 10-16% for wine, and 40-45% for spirits. 
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appearance of random measurement error, but in other cases it suggests that additional factors 
are at work (e.g., Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, France).     
Table 1 confirms these impressions by reporting regressions of the cirrhosis death rate on 
alcohol consumption per capita.
6   Consumption always enters positively and usually statistically 
significantly. Consistent with the figures, however, the coefficients vary substantially in 
magnitude and significance. Although contemporaneous consumption is an important 
determinant of cirrhosis, other factors matter as well.
7  
Table 2 considers a first such factor by adding the lag of alcohol consumption to the 
regressions.  The last column shows the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged 
consumption.  The lagged value of consumption sometimes enters positively and significantly, 
but the results are not particularly consistent.    In many cases the second lag enters negatively 
rather than positively.   In a number of other cases the second lag enters positively, but the 
contemporaneous value becomes negative.  And when the lag enters positively, the coefficient 
on the second lag is sometimes larger than the coefficient on contemporaneous consumption.   
The second to last column does indicate that the sum of the lag coefficients is always positive, 
and the range of estimated “impacts” is fairly tight.  Regressions using longer lags yield similar 
results; the sum of the lag coefficients is always positive, but there is considerable noise in the 
individual coefficients on current and lagged consumption.   These regressions thus confirm that 
                                                      
6 We also estimate Tables 1-5 including a time trend, with similar results. 
 
7 The Durbin-Watson statistics from the OLS regressions indicate the presence of positive 




accounting for lags in the relation between consumption and cirrhosis is important; they do not 
provide a parsimonious method of accounting for those lags. 
Table 3 therefore presents regressions of cirrhosis on lagged cirrhosis and contemporaneous 
alcohol consumption.  This is the correct specification if cirrhosis is a geometric distributed lag 
of current and past consumption.  As in Table 2, the results are consistent overall.  Here, 
however, the U.S. is a glaring exception when estimated over the post-WWII sample; the 
coefficient on alcohol consumption is negative.   Since the U.S. data are the most relevant for our 
purposes, this result is troubling.   When we restrict the sample to the periods “near” Prohibition, 
however, the estimates are better behaved.  And we show below that conditioning on the age and 
sex structure of the population also eliminates this anomaly. 
A potentially important mediating factor between alcohol consumption and the cirrhosis 
death rate is the age structure of the population.   Cirrhosis deaths occur almost exclusively 
among persons aged 35 and over, particularly those aged 55-75.
8 To eliminate the effects of 
changes in the age-composition of the population, time-series analyses often use age-adjusted 
death rates (Anderson and Rosenberg 1998).   We cannot utilize that approach here because age-
specific cirrhosis death rates by state, which are crucial for our analysis, are not available before 
1920.  We show below that an alternative approach yields reasonable answers.   
Table 4 repeats the regressions in Table 3 but adding the percentage of the population that is 
male and the fraction of the population in each of 11 age categories.
9 For ease of comparison, the 
                                                      
8 In 1998, the total death rate due to chronic liver disease and cirrhosis was 7.2 per 100,000 
people.  The age-specific rates were as follows: age 25-34, 1.4; age 35-44, 8.2; age 45-54, 20.3; 
age 55-64, 25.4; age 65-74, 23.8; age 75-84, 18.6; over 85, 12.6. 
 
9 For the U.S. we use age variables for each of 7 categories. 
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last column repeats the coefficient on alcohol consumption from Table 3.  The coefficients on 
alcohol consumption from the regressions with and without the age variables are similar in most 
cases.  We reject equality of the Table 3 and Table 4 coefficients on alcohol consumption in the 
cases of Australia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the U.S. pre-1950.  In the post-WWII U.S. 
sample the puzzling negative coefficient from the regression without age and sex variables 
becomes positive.  Thus, controlling for the age composition in this way appears reasonable and, 
in the case of the U.S., important.
10  
A final issue that confronts the use of cirrhosis as a proxy for alcohol consumption is the 
possibility that the relation between consumption and cirrhosis is not symmetric.  Bio-medical 
evidence suggests that cirrhosis results from a long history of drinking, but it also suggests that 
the liver can regenerate if drinking stops and that one must be actively drinking to die from 
cirrhosis.   The combination of these facts suggests an asymmetry in the effect of alcohol 
consumption on cirrhosis: substantial declines in consumption would produce contemporaneous 
declines in cirrhosis, but substantial increases in consumption, especially from a low level, might 
take years to yield noticeably higher cirrhosis death rates.  As shown below, this issue is 
important for interpreting the time-series behavior of cirrhosis at the beginning and end of 
Prohibition. 
Table 5 addresses this possibility by regressing cirrhosis on lagged cirrhosis, the age and sex 
composition variables, and alcohol consumption, separating consumption into two pieces: 
                                                      
10 For the 1941-1997 period, we have compared standard, age-adjusted cirrhosis death rates to 
rates “adjusted” using our procedure and found a high degree of correlation. 
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multiplied by an increase dummy and multiplied by a decrease dummy.
11  For most countries, 
the coefficient on consumption when consumption is increasing is similar to the coefficient when 
consumption is decreasing.  We can reject equality of the coefficients for Canada and Belgium at 
the 5% level and Austria and the full sample of the U.S. at the 10% level. This outcome is 
perhaps surprising given the bio-medical evidence discussed above, although some sources 
suggest that cirrhosis can develop within a short period (Galambos 1979, p. 3). In any case, the 
regressions do not suggest a strong degree of asymmetry.   
We draw the following conclusions from this examination of the data on cirrhosis and 
alcohol consumption.  Time-series fluctuations in consumption exert a positive and significant 
effect on cirrhosis, although this relation is far from exact.  The relation between consumption 
and cirrhosis appears to involve substantial lags, implying a highly persistent cirrhosis death rate.   
There is only mild evidence of asymmetry in the effect of alcohol consumption on cirrhosis, 
although this is difficult to determine with available data.  The age and sex composition of the 
population appear to be important determinants of cirrhosis, at least in the U.S. data. 
 
3. The Effect of Prohibition on Cirrhosis 
We now examine the relation between Alcohol Prohibition and cirrhosis.   We focus in this 
section on basic facts about the cirrhosis death rate and then discuss the potential role of state 
prohibitions in explaining these facts.  In Section 4 we consider regressions that account for other 
determinants of cirrhosis death rates.   
                                                      
11 Specifically, the increase dummy equals one if current consumption is greater than or equal to 
consumption in the previous period and zero otherwise.  The decrease dummy equals one if 




Figure 3 presents the cirrhosis death rate for the United States over the period 1900-1997.   
Cirrhosis was low during the fourteen years of Prohibition compared to periods before or after.   
The average value over the years 1920-1933 was 7.3, while the average value in the years 1900-
1919 and 1934-1997 was 11.5.
12  This simple comparison between the Prohibition and non-
Prohibition years is the basis for the claim that Prohibition reduced cirrhosis.  In particular, many 
previous analyses have compared cirrhosis between a pre-Prohibition year, such as 1915, and a 
Prohibition year, such as 1925, and concluded that Prohibition reduced the cirrhosis death rate by 
almost 50%.
13  
Further examination, however, suggests this conclusion is premature.  To begin, there is 
substantial variation in the cirrhosis death rate outside the Prohibition period (as well as 
substantial variation in countries without prohibition).  This suggests that other factors play a 
substantial role in causing fluctuations in cirrhosis death rates.    
In addition, the timing of the increases and decreases in cirrhosis challenges the view that 
Prohibition caused the low level of cirrhosis during the 1920s and early 1930s.  Figure 4 presents 
the same data as Figure 3 but for the years 1900-1940, to facilitate examination of the years 
directly before and after Prohibition.   This examination reveals two facts.   Cirrhosis does not 
display a dramatic increase after repeal of Prohibition at the end of 1933.  And cirrhosis had 
                                                      
12 The 18
th Amendment took effect January, 1920; the 21
st Amendment repealing Prohibition 
took effect December, 1933. 
 
13 Edwards et al. (1994) note that “during Prohibition in America, for example, cirrhosis 
mortality declined by almost 50% (p. 131).”  MacCoun and Reuter (2001) comment that “rates 
for cirrhosis of the liver fell by 50 percent early in Prohibition and recovered promptly after 
Repeal in 1933 (p. 161).”   
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almost reached its low 1920 value by 1919, the year before constitutional Prohibition took 
effect.
14  Moreover, cirrhosis started declining slowly in 1908 and then began decreasing more 
quickly around 1916.  
The fact that cirrhosis did not jump upon repeal is inconsistent with an important role for 
Prohibition in affecting cirrhosis if increased alcohol consumption has a contemporaneous effect 
on cirrhosis.  If, on the other hand, it takes years or decades for alcohol consumption to cause 
death from cirrhosis, one might expect a substantial lag before any increased consumption 
following repeal could cause a noticeable increase in cirrhosis.  The results above did not provide 
strong evidence that increases in consumption have a smaller impact on cirrhosis than decreases.  
Given the uncertainty surrounding the precise relation between consumption and cirrhosis, 
however, it is difficult to take a strong stand on this particular piece of evidence.  The absence of 
a marked jump in cirrhosis after repeal is not suggestive of a major effect, but this is a test with 
low power. 
The fact that cirrhosis had declined to essentially its minimum level before constitutional 
Prohibition took effect, and that it had been declining for at least a decade, is more problematic 
for the view that Prohibition caused the low level of cirrhosis during the 1920s and early 1930s.    
Indeed, the general downward trend in cirrhosis stops in the very year Prohibition took effect.   
Thus, a critical issue is understanding the pre-1920 decline in cirrhosis. 
 
 
                                                      
14 Thornton (1991) appropriately notes that cirrhosis death rates had begun to decline prior to 
Prohibition (p. 105n); however, he suggests this decline is due to state prohibitions, wartime  
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State Prohibitions 
One possible explanation for the pre-1920 decline in cirrhosis is state-level prohibitions.  
Thirty-two states adopted prohibition laws during the pre-1920 period, and the number of states 
with such laws increased noticeably during the 1910s.  Table 6 shows the states adopting state-
level prohibition in each year over the 1900-1920 period. The table seems to suggest these 
prohibitions caused the decrease in cirrhosis during the 1910s since the number of state 
prohibitions increased substantially around the time cirrhosis decreased.  
Several factors, however, cast doubt on the hypothesis that state-level prohibitions caused 
the pre-1920 decline in cirrhosis.  Although the number of states with prohibition was large, 
these states were predominantly rural, low population states.   By 1918, thirty-one states had 
adopted a prohibition law, but 52.1% of the population lived in wet states, and the distribution of 
states that passed prohibition laws before WWI was not random.  Of the twenty-six that had 
prohibition laws, “fourteen were west of the Mississippi.  Eight were south of the Ohio and 
Potomac.  Two (Maine and New Hampshire) were in northern, rural New England (Merz 1930, 
p. 19).” Only two (Michigan and Indiana) were populated, industrial states.  
The role of state prohibition is also not compelling because the laws in many states were 
weak; in particular, they fell far short of bone-dry prohibition (Merz 1930, pp. 20-22).  Many 
states allowed for the importation of certain quantities of alcohol and/or home manufacture.  For 
example, Alabama law allowed any citizen to import two quarts of distilled spirits or two gallons 
of wine or five gallons of beer every fifteen days.  Virginia law allowed importation of one quart 
of distilled spirits or three gallons of beer or one gallon of wine every thirty days, except for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
prohibitions and increased taxes (p. 103).  We show below that taxes and state prohibitions play 
little role in this pre-1920 decline.  
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students at a university, college or other school, or minors, or a female not the head of 
household.  Indiana laws stated that it did not intend to interfere with domestic manufacture of 
wine.  Michigan, New Hampshire, Iowa, and North Dakota laws did not prohibit importation for 
personal use. Mississippi law permitted manufacture of homemade wine.  North Carolina 
allowed importation of one quart of spirits or five gallons of beer every fifteen days.  West 
Virginia permitted manufacture of wine for personal use and importation of one quart of liquor 
every thirty days.  Tennessee permitted manufacture for personal use.  South Carolina allowed 
importation of one quart of liquor every thirty days for medicinal purposes.
15  
Figures 5 and 6 provide an initial look at the possible effect of state prohibition laws by 
showing state-level data on cirrhosis for two groups of states: those that were wet throughout the 
pre-1920 period, and those that adopted state prohibition laws at some point during this period.  
We present only a subset of the states in each category to avoid cluttering the graph; the 
regression analysis in Section 4 considers the complete set of states. 
The figures show that the most dramatic declines in cirrhosis occurred in states that were 
wet throughout the pre-1920 period, and these states included several of the most populous states 
(e.g., New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey).   There is some evidence of declines in states that 
adopted prohibition during this period, but the declines appear smaller on average than the 
declines in wet states.   These figures do not support the hypothesis that state prohibition laws 
lowered cirrhosis death rates. 
                                                      
15 Isaac (1965) provides a detailed analysis of the prohibition movement in Tennessee up to the 
passage of constitutional prohibition.  He describes both the legal regime and enforcement as 
weak during the first few years of state prohibition, 1909-1913, and he suggests that alcohol 
consumption continued without much interruption in the larger cities.  He also describes the legal 
regime and the degree of enforcement as becoming gradually stricter beginning in 1914, but he 
suggests that liquor was still widely available at least in the major cities.  
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A further suggestive piece of evidence on the effects of state prohibitions comes from a 
more detailed examination of the data on alcohol consumption and cirrhosis for the pre-1920 
period, shown in Figure 7.   The key fact is that cirrhosis declined before alcohol consumption 
declined; indeed, alcohol consumption gives no indication of a decline until 1918, well after the 
wave of state prohibition adoptions.
16 Thus, if one examines alcohol consumption, rather than 
cirrhosis, even the aggregate data suggest little effect of the state prohibitions. 
 
4. Regression Analysis 
The data presented above raise questions about the role of state prohibitions in causing the 
cirrhosis decline during 1910s, and they suggest caution in crediting constitutional prohibition 
for the low level of cirrhosis during the 1920-1933 period.  These data, however, do not account 
for the range of factors that might influence cirrhosis.   In this section we present two methods 
for examining the influence of state and national prohibition while controlling for the effects of 
other variables. 
Regressions with Unconstrained Year Dummies  
Our first method of analyzing the impact of these policies is to estimate the equation 
cit =  α i + γ  pit + ρ  cit-1 + β t + ε it       (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
16 The official data potentially overstate the actual decline in alcohol consumption because the 
federal laws passed during this period plausibly induced underreporting.  For example, the higher 
tax rates adopted in 1916-1917 might have encouraged home production, and the federal order to 
close the breweries and distilleries (see below) might have spawned illicit production.  
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where cit is the cirrhosis death rate in state i in year t, α i is a fixed effect for state i, pit is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if state i had a state prohibition law in effect in year t and zero otherwise, β t is 
a year dummy for year t, and ε it is an error term.
17 
This specification allows us to estimate the impact of state prohibitions on cirrhosis while 
allowing for a general set of aggregate effects. Thus, the year dummies account for any 
aggregate changes in tax rates, demographics, social attitudes, or other variables that might 
influence cirrhosis, as well as for Prohibition or pre-1920 anti-alcohol policies (see below).   This 
specification does not account for state-level time-series variation in these variables; in most 
cases appropriate data are not available.
18   This approach also fails to identify the separate 
effects of different aggregate factors, but examination of the year dummies themselves 
potentially sheds light on the influence of such variables.
 19 
Table 7 reports the results of estimating (1) using state-level data on cirrhosis death rates.
20  
The panel is not balanced; in ten states cirrhosis data are available beginning in 1900 while in 
                                                      
17 This regression does not account for the possibility that state prohibition might be endogenous 
to cirrhosis death rates.  One possibility is that states with low or falling death rates were more 
likely to adopt prohibition.  In this case, the regression results overstate the effect of state-level 
prohibitions.  Most prohibition laws were passed in low cirrhosis states. 
 
18 State-level alcohol taxes are available but awkward to employ because some states used state 
provision as a way to raise alcohol prices.   We have experimented with different specifications 
of state alcohol policy and found that inclusion of this information has virtually no impact on the 
results reported here. 
 
19 In addition to the specifications reported here, we have also estimated regressions that include 
an interaction term between state prohibition and federal prohibition.   These generally yield a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term and a more negative or less positive coefficient on 
state prohibitions.  The implied impacts of state prohibition are overall extremely similar to those 
reported in the text. 
 
20 The dates of the state prohibition laws are from Wickersham (1931) and Distilled Spirits 
Institute, various issues.  
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other states the first year of data varies.  The results are weighted by state population, although 
this makes only a small difference to the results.   We consider three different sample periods: 
1900-1919, 1900-1950, and 1900-1997.    The shorter samples reduce the impact of 
inconsistencies in measurement of cirrhosis, and the earlier data appear better correlated with 
alcohol consumption.  The longer sample contains more information and is preferable so long as 
the equation is correctly specified and the data are measured consistently.  
The results for 1900-1919 show a positive but insignificant effect of state prohibitions on 
cirrhosis while the results for 1900-1950 yield a positive and significant effect.  The results for 
1900-1997 show a negative but insignificant effect of state prohibitions.     
       To assess the quantitative importance of these results (especially those for the 1900-1997 
sample), we use the estimated equations to simulate the path of cirrhosis in the absence of state 
prohibitions and then calculate the percent decrease in cirrhosis caused by state prohibitions.
21  
These calculations are provided in bottom rows of Table 7.  The results using the 1900-1919 and 
1900-1950 regressions indicate that state prohibitions raised cirrhosis, consistent with the 
positive coefficient on state prohibitions.  The results using the 1900-1997 estimates indicate that 
state prohibitions reduced cirrhosis by less than 1% during the 1910-1920 and 1920-1933 
periods, by about 6% during the 1933-1950 period, and by 2% during the 1950-1997 period.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
21 The simulations are computed as follows.  For each state, the actual cirrhosis death rate is used 
for the initial year and any years up to the passage of state prohibition.  Once a state has adopted 
prohibition, the regression coefficients are used to predict the cirrhosis death rate in the absence 
of the state prohibition.  This predicted cirrhosis death rate is then used as the lagged cirrhosis 
death rate for the next year’s prediction.  Predicted values are calculated for all years after a state 
has passed prohibition, even once the prohibition is repealed.  The calculated impact is the 
predicted cirrhosis death rate over the given period less the actual cirrhosis death rate, all divided 
by the predicted cirrhosis death rate.  Thus, the impact for states that did not pass a state 
prohibition is zero. 
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Thus, even if one takes the insignificant coefficient from the 1900-1997 regression at face value, 
it indicates state prohibitions played little role in reducing cirrhosis death rates.  
Figures 8a and 8b present the estimated year dummies from the regressions without the 
interaction term.
22   The estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that, controlling for state 
prohibitions and lagged cirrhosis, there are only modest effects of constitutional prohibition.  The 
estimates do suggest that one or more factors caused a large decline in cirrhosis during the last 2-
3 years before the onset of constitutional prohibition, but conditional on this decline, cirrhosis 
proceeded almost as would have been expected in the absence of Prohibition due to its high 
degree of autocorrelation.    
  Regressions with Controls for Aggregate Effects  
  We now consider regressions of the form  
cit =  α i + γ  pit + δ  zt + θ  Pt + ρ  cit-1 + β  xt + ε it            
(2) 
where zt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years 1917-1919 and zero otherwise, Pt is a 
measure of national prohibition, xt is other aggregate variables, and ε it is an error term.    These 
regressions exclude year dummies. 
  We include the term zt to account for the possible effects of pre-1920 federal anti-alcohol 
policies.  In February 1917, Congress passed the Reed bone-dry amendment, which forbade 
interstate shipment of liquor into states that prohibited manufacture and sale, even if the state 
                                                      
22 The plots from the regressions with the interaction terms are similar.  
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allowed importation. (Merz 1930, p. 20).
23   In August 1917, Congress adopted the Food Control 
Law, which forbade the manufacture of distilled spirits from any form of foodstuff, and closed 
the distilleries  (Merz 1930, pp. 26-27, 40-41); in September 1918, it closed the breweries as well 
(Merz 1930, p. 41).  Also in September 1918, Congress approved wartime prohibition, although 
this prohibition did not take effect until July 1, 1919 (Merz 1930, p. 41).   The wartime 
prohibition act contained the first general restriction on sale, providing that after June 30, 1919, 
no liquor could be sold for beverage purposes except for export (Schmeckebier 1929, pp. 4-5).   
  We control for tax rates on alcohol by including the real, statutory tax rate on distilled 
spirits or the real, statutory tax rate on non-beverage distilled spirits.
24,25 Those caught violating 
Prohibition were required to pay taxes on the alcohol produced. Thus, an interaction term 
between Prohibition and the tax rate allows for a differing effect of the tax during Prohibition.  
Also, distilled spirits produced for non-beverage purposes and taxed at the non-beverage rate 
were frequently diverted to beverage spirits. Hu (1950) states that relatively little beverage spirits 
tax revenue was collected during Prohibition compared to the quantities diverted from non-
                                                      
23 In February 1913, Congress had adopted the Webb-Kenyon Law, which prohibited shipments 
of liquor from wet states into dry states if such shipments were in violation of the dry state law.  
This did not prohibit all shipments into dry states, since some dry states allowed importation 
(Merz 1930, p. 14).   The law was widely viewed as ineffective, which was one reason for the 
Reed amendment. 
 
24 We have also measured the tax rate using the implicit tax rate on all alcoholic beverages.  This 
measure is constructed using data on tax revenues and consumption expenditures.  Thus, 
adequate measures are not available during Prohibition.  Using the implicit tax rate leads to 
estimates that suggest that Prohibition increased consumption. Miron (1997) explains the 
construction of the tax variables. 
 
25 Alcoholic substances produced for purposes such as medicine, flavoring extracts, etc. were 
considered legal non-beverage spirits and taxed at a lower rate. Hu (1950) provides more detail 
on federal taxation of distilled spirits during this period. 
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beverage or industrial uses.  This suggests that the non-beverage tax may better capture the tax 
faced by producers during Prohibition.  Estimates of the effect of Prohibition are lower in the 
non-beverage tax specifications.
26,27 
  We employ the U.K. cirrhosis death rate as a measure of social attitudes, since the 
Temperance movement existed across countries.  We control for the level of income using real 
GNP per capita.  We also include but do not report the age and sex composition variables 
discussed above. 
  Tables 8 and 9 present results for the 1900-1997 and 1900-1950 periods, respectively.   
The left half of each table employs a dummy variable to measure Prohibition while the right half 
employs real enforcement expenditure per capita.
28,29 
  The results are consistent across specifications.  The coefficient on lagged cirrhosis 
always enters statistically significantly, in the range of 0.87–0.88.  Thus, cirrhosis is highly 
persistent, even after controlling for these other factors. 
  State prohibitions are estimated to have a negative and sometimes statistically significant 
effect in the 1900-1997 regressions but a positive and statistically significant effect in the 1900-
1950 regressions.   The estimated impact is slightly greater than in the regressions with 
                                                      
26 Similar regressions using the real federal tax rate on beer in place of the tax on distilled spirits 
produce similar but somewhat smaller estimates of the effect of Prohibition. 
 
27 We have also estimated the regressions including state tax rates on distilled spirits and an 
indicator variable for whether a state is a control state.  The estimates are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar. 
 
28 Including an interaction between state and federal prohibition has little impact on these results. 
 
29 Miron (1999) discusses the construction of the real enforcement expenditure data. 
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unconstrained year dummies, presumably because those year dummies account for unmeasured 
determinants of cirrhosis that correlate with state prohibitions.   Since the year dummy approach 
is the more robust method of estimating the state prohibition effects, we regard those as the more 
relevant estimates.
30   In any case, the implied impacts of state prohibitions are similar to those 
shown in Table 7. 
  The dummy for 1917-1919 enters significantly in all regressions, with a coefficient in the 
range   –0.27 to –1.7. Whether this reflects pre-1920 federal anti-alcohol policies cannot be 
determined from these regressions, but there are reasons to doubt these policies had a major 
impact.  Cirrhosis began declining in 1908, albeit at a slower rate, well before these laws took 
effect.  The Reed amendment (like the earlier Webb-Kenyon law) was designed to facilitate 
enforcement of state prohibitions, but the evidence presented here suggests these had little effect 
overall and none in the pre-1920 period.  The Food Control Laws did not prevent importation of 
alcohol or consumption of existing stocks, and wartime prohibition did not take effect until July 
1, 1919.  Moreover, Congress made no appropriations for enforcement of any of these laws.  
  Attributing the 1917-1919 decline in cirrhosis to pre-1920 anti-alcohol policies is also 
problematic because there are other plausible explanations that are not fully accounted for by our 
regressions.  Until 1920, annual estimates of the age composition of the population were based 
on interpolations of decadal census data without annual data on births, deaths or immigration 
(Bureau of the Census, 1975).  Thus, for the pre-1920 period, our age composition variables 
plausibly miss important influences on cirrhosis such as the massive decline in immigration rates 
                                                      
30 Constraining the coefficient on state prohibition to that obtained in the regression with 
unconstrained year dummies has no significant effect on the coefficient on Prohibition or any of 
the other variables.  
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during the 1910s. In addition, World War I and the flu epidemic of 1918 produced an enormous 
surge in the death rate (Bureau of the Census, 1975, pp. 58-62), so the population at risk of 
cirrhosis was likely substantially reduced during the years 1918-1919.  Warburton (1932, p. 25) 
suggests that alcoholic beverages were stockpiled in anticipation of wartime restrictions.  And as 
noted above, the decline in cirrhosis appears to precede the decline in alcohol consumption.  
Thus, we are skeptical that the pre-1920 decline in cirrhosis is mainly due to anti-alcohol 
policies, but we cannot rule out that possibility.  
  The coefficients on constitutional prohibition indicate it reduced cirrhosis.  To gauge the 
magnitude, we simulate the path of cirrhosis in the absence of Prohibition.
31  The average 
percent decrease in the cirrhosis death rate during Prohibition relative to the simulated rate is in 
the bottom row of Tables 8 and 9. The estimated reductions range from –20.8% to 30.9% with an 
average reduction across specifications of 12.6%. 
The correct interpretation of the cirrhosis data is thus that various factors led to a dramatic 
decline in cirrhosis between roughly 1908 and 1920, especially during the years 1917-1919.    
There is no evidence that state prohibitions caused this decline, and it is unclear whether pre-
1920 federal anti-alcohol policies contributed to the decline.   Given the persistence of cirrhosis 
and the low level it had reached by 1920, however, the continued low level during the 1920-1933 
period does not suggest a major effect of constitutional prohibition in causing this low level.  
Instead, our estimates suggest constitutional prohibition reduced cirrhosis by 10-20%.  
                                                      
31 We use actual cirrhosis death rates for the years prior to Prohibition.  Then, we estimate the 
predicted cirrhosis death rate in the absence of prohibition using the estimated regression 
coefficients.  The predicted rate is then used as the lagged cirrhosis death rate for the next year’s 
prediction.  The estimated impact is the simulated cirrhosis death rate less the actual cirrhosis 





       We conclude by relating our results to the literature on the price-elasticity of the demand 
for alcohol.    That literature offers a broad range of elasticity estimates, from virtually zero for 
certain population subgroups to well in excess of -1.0 overall.
32 If the true elasticity is in the 
middle of this range, the small response of cirrhosis to Prohibition is surprising given the 
conventional view that alcohol prices rose substantially during Prohibition.  The estimates in 
Table 4 above indicate an elasticity of cirrhosis with respect to alcohol consumption of 0.4-0.7, 
and Thornton (1991) suggests that alcohol prices rose by about 500%.  This implies that cirrhosis 
should have fallen to almost nothing, rather than declining 10-20% as estimated above. 
One possible reconciliation is that the relevant elasticity is in fact quite low.   The proxy for 
alcohol consumption considered here is plausibly a better measure of heavy consumption than of 
moderate consumption.  Theory does not suggest that heavy or addictive consumption is 
necessarily inelastic (Becker and Murphy 1988), but there is evidence from micro data 
suggesting that heavy consumption of alcohol is in fact virtually price inelastic (Manning, 
Blumberg, and Moulton 1995). 
A second possible reconciliation is that the standard view about alcohol prices is inaccurate.  
The conventional wisdom is based on data in Warburton (1932) and Fisher (1928, 1930); re-
examination of these data suggests a more nuanced picture.  
                                                      
32 See Phelps and Leung (1991) for a detailed review and Chaloupka, Grossman, Becker and 
Murphy (1993), Chaloupka and Grossman (1994), Manning, Blumberg, and Moulton (1995), 
Moore and Cook (1995), Chaloupka and Wechsler (1996), Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1997), 
Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1998), and Williams, Chaloupka, and Wechsler (2002) for 
more recent work.   
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A first problem with the standard view is that it neglects the behavior of the overall price 
level.   Warburton's data compare prices between 1911-1915 and 1926-1930, while Fisher's 
compare prices between 1916 and 1928.  Both authors examine the behavior of nominal prices, 
yet the price level increased by approximately 75 per cent between these two periods (Bureau of 
the Census (1975), p. 211).   Thus, the raw data presented by Warburton and Fisher overstate the 
increase in the relative price of alcohol. 
In addition, Warburton presents a broad range of prices for the Prohibition period, and the 
lowest prices reported suggest that, even ignoring inflation, some alcoholic beverage prices fell 
relative to the pre-Prohibition period.   This does not prove consumers paid less on average for 
alcohol, but they faced an incentive to buy at the lowest prices and then stockpile the quantities 
purchased.  The available data do not allow computation of the average price actually paid, and 
the extremely high prices reported in many cases by both Warburton and Fisher allow for the 
possibility that the average price in fact rose. But the magnitude of this rise is undoubtedly less 
than they asserted, and it is possible prices failed to rise substantially overall.  If prices did not 
increase very much, there is no puzzle in the failure of consumption to fall substantially.   
This last “explanation” raises the question of why prices would not have risen more 
strongly.   One possibility is that because black market suppliers faced low marginal costs of 
evading alcohol taxes and cost-increasing regulation, the net effect of prohibition on costs was 
modest (Miron 2003). 
A second hypothesis is that Prohibition had little chance of being effective because of the 
numerous avenues for evasion (Merz 1930, pp.65-71).  Under Prohibition, physicians, druggists 
and manufacturers of proprietary medicines could receive licenses to prescribe and dispense  
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liquor for “medicinal” purposes.  The production of beer for the purpose of making near beer 
remained legal, as did the production of industrial alcohol.
33  Both exceptions to Prohibition 
allowed for substantial diversion to consumption.  Smuggling across the vast borders of the U.S. 
provided another way to circumvent Prohibition.  And perhaps most importantly, home 
production and small scale production of alcohol proliferated, thereby straining even the most 
vigorous enforcement efforts.  
  A third possibility is that Prohibition created a forbidden fruit effect, thereby shifting 
preferences for alcohol and partially offsetting the depressing effect on demand of higher prices.   
This hypothesis receives anecdotal support in some contexts, and accounts of drinking behavior 
during Prohibition are consistent with such an effect (e.g., the term “roaring 20s”). Without more 
detailed evidence, however, one cannot interpret the results here as a strong indication of such an 
effect.  
Determining which of the above hypotheses is the best interpretation of the factual results in 
this paper is not possible without further research.   The implications of any interpretation, 
however, are important for policy toward a wide variety of currently prohibited activities.  
                                                      
33 The method of producing near beer is to make real beer and then remove most of the alcohol.  
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Table 1: Regressions of Cirrhosis on Alcohol Consumption 
 
Country Sample  Period  constant  At R
2 D-W
     
 
Australia   1958-95  -2.577  1.111  0.93 0.941 
     (5.38)  (19.08)   
Austria    1958-90  1.546 2.549 0.65  0.680 
      (0.43) (7.18)  
Belgium    1958-93  3.185 0.978 0.84  1.277 
     (6.29)  (15.08)   
Czech   1958-72  -3.037  2.140 0.92  1.327 
     (2.51)  (11.95)   
Denmark    1958-95  3.712 0.851 0.75  0.551 
      (5.41) (8.63)  
Hungary   1958-72  -0.483  1.463  0.9  2.086 
     (0.91)  (21.95)   
Italy   1958-95  23.692  0.325  0.01  0.042 
      (9.77) (1.19)  
Netherlands    1958-95  2.812 0.259 0.78  1.453 
     (15.58)  (9.79)   
Norway    1958-95  1.015 1.041 0.46  0.933 
      (1.66) (5.27)    
Sweden   1958-95  -6.701  2.805  0.67  0.260 
      (3.74) (7.66)  
Canada  1922-56,1958-95  1.053 1.082 0.9  0.332 
     (3.48)  (16.33)   
U.K.   1952-1995  -0.737  0.810  0.78  0.143 
      (1.81) (9.68)  
Ireland  1933-37,1953-94  1.759 0.228 0.47  1.065 
      (7.53) (5.40)  
France 1925-35,1946-94  2.408 1.502 0.38  0.303 
      (0.48) (4.95)  
Finland   1958-1995  -0.188 1.184  0.7 0.136 
      (0.31) (8.09)  
U.S.  1900-19,  1935-50  0.942 1.847 0.65  0.403 
      (0.81) (8.24)  
U.S.    1950-1995  7.724 0.647 0.14  0.047 
      (5.58) (2.95)  
U.S.  1900-19,  1934-95  5.500 0.996 0.36  0.090 
      (5.86) (5.95)        
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 2: Regressions of Cirrhosis on Alcohol Consumption and Lagged 
Consumption  
 
Country Sample  Period  constant  At A t-1  β 1 [At]+β 2[At-1] R
2 
 
Australia  1958-95  -2.600 1.319 -0.206 1.113  0.94 
      (-5.32) (4.17) (-0.69) (19.02)   
Austria  1958-90  2.547 -0.260  2.744 2.485  0.78 
      (0.77) (-0.24)  (2.76) (7.56)   
Belgium   1958-93  3.162  1.062 -0.082 0.980  0.90 
     (5.96)  (3.37)  (-0.28)  (14.76)   
Czech   1958-72  -3.032  0.933  1.255  2.188 0.94 
     (-2.67)  (1.11)  (1.58)  (13.77)   
Denmark    1958-95  4.078 -0.193  1.021 0.828  0.86 
      (5.65) (-0.25)  (1.37) (8.66)   
Hungary   1958-72  -0.682 1.093 0.413  1.505  0.91 
     (-0.85)  (2.69)  (0.86)  (13.23)   
Italy   1958-95 16.890  -5.240  6.070  0.830  0.92 
      (6.19) (-2.55)  (2.86) (3.62)   
Netherlands    1958-95  2.918 -0.045  0.295 0.250  0.80 
     (16.12)  (-0.31)  (2.09)  (9.86)   
Norway    1958-95  1.024 0.922  0.118 1.040  0.52 
      (1.61) (1.34)  (0.21) (5.13)   
Sweden   1958-95  -6.737 0.147  2.680 2.827  0.85 
     (-3.72)  (0.15)  (2.51)  (7.77)   
Canada 1922-56,1958-95  0.994 1.462  -0.374  1.088  0.90 
     (2.99)  (3.23)  (-0.89)  (16.03)   
U.K.   1952-1995  -0.652  -0.394  1.205  0.812  0.93 
     (-1.79)  (-0.91)  (2.6)  (10.4)   
Ireland 1933-37,1953-94  1.707 0.283  -0.047  0.236  0.48 
     (6.55)  (1.3)  (-0.22)  (5.09)   
France  1925-35,1946-94  3.276 0.529  0.929 1.458  0.57 
      (0.63) (0.4) (0.69) (4.62)   
Finland   1958-1995 0.216 -0.991  2.147 1.156  0.90 
      (0.47) (-1.16)  (2.42) (9.39)   
U.S.  1900-19,  1935-50  0.740 1.522  0.355 1.877  0.92 
      (0.60) (4.68)  (1.29) (7.93)   
U.S.   1950-1995  7.773  5.599  -4.975  0.624  0.39 
     (6.87)  (4.65)  (-4.22)  (3.53)   
U.S. 1900-19,  1934-95  5.425  1.625  -0.623  1.002  0.50 
      (4.87)  (3.88)  (-1.41)  (5.26)                 
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 3: Regressions of Cirrhosis on Lagged Cirrhosis and Alcohol Consumption  
 
Country Sample  Period  constant  Ct-1 A t   R
2    
 
Australia  1958-95  -1.902  0.304 0.786 0.94 
      (-2.64)  (1.61) (3.39)    
Austria    1958-90  4.333 0.730 0.339 0.85 
      (1.57) (10.4) (1.1)     
Belgium   1958-93  2.364 0.448 0.476 0.85 
      (3.17) (2.23) (2.2)     
Czech    1958-72  -2.548  0.567 1.151 0.96 
      (-2.34)  (2.05) (2.02)    
Denmark    1958-95  1.064 0.729 0.237 0.88 
      (1.72) (5.77) (2.18)    
Hungary   1958-72  -0.504  0.163 1.245 0.9 
      (-0.73)  (0.54) (2.95)    
Italy    1958-95  -1.099  0.910 0.321 0.98 
     (-1.03)  (44.29)  (4.53)     
Netherlands    1958-95  2.008 0.301 0.177 0.78 
      (4.64) (2.49) (5.64)      
Norway   1958-95  0.322 0.493 0.579 0.61   
      (0.73) (4.92) (3.52)      
Sweden    1958-95  -1.944  0.792 0.692 0.93   
      (-1.61)  (9.58) (2.23)      
Canada  1922-56,1958-95  0.260 0.850 0.151 0.97   
      (1.84) (13.65)  (2.43)      
U.K.    1952-1995 -0.228  0.969 0.077 0.98   
     (-2.44)  (12.29)  (1.5)       
Ireland  1933-37,1953-94  1.073 0.437 0.120 0.57   
      (4.26) (3.21) (2.74)      
France  1925-35,1946-94  -1.919  0.790 0.461 0.82   
      (-0.95)  (6.01) (3.29)      
Finland    1958-1995 -0.238  0.893 0.198 0.97   
      (-1.56)  (13.6) (2.57)      
U.S.  1900-19,  1935-50  -0.266  0.812 0.413 0.92   
     (-0.44)  (10.65)  (2.14)       
U.S.    1950-1995 1.155 1.042 -0.246  0.97   
     (-3.03)  (35.54)  (4.59)       
U.S.  1900-19,  1934-95  0.431 0.984 -0.045  0.94   
     (-1.16)  (27.52)  (0.58)         
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 4: Regressions of Cirrhosis on Alcohol Consumption and Age and Sex Variables 
 
                        Table 3 
Country Sample  Period  constant Ct-1 A t A t R
2   
 
Australia   1958-95  652.20  -0.305  0.849  0.786 0.98 
     (75.02)  (1.95)  (2.11)       
Austria   1958-90  -802.77  0.235 -0.538  0.339  0.92 
     (12.16)  (1.42)  (0.73)       
Belgium   1958-93  32713.2 0.049  1.054 0.476  0.92 
     (1420.91)  (0.34)  (5.16)       
Czech   1958-72  176246.2  -0.635  0.378  1.151  0.99 
     (3867.83)  (1.78)  (0.61)       
Denmark   1958-95  -50845.91  0.008  -0.121 0.237 0.94 
     (1274.08)  (0.05)  (0.25)       
Hungary   1958-72  -629391.34  -0.507 -0.169  1.245  0.97 
     (2426.22)  (1.25)  (0.23)       
Italy   1958-95 369.25  0.842  0.020  0.321  0.98 
     (0.11)  (11.05)  (0.06)       
Norway   1958-95  -8736.59  -0.200 1.952 0.579  0.78 
     (156.73)  (0.91)  (2.91)       
Sweden   1958-95  -13044.33  0.265 1.559  0.692  0.98 
     (376.22)  (2.16)  (3.67)       
Canada 1922-56,1958-95  -3248.65  0.067 1.000  0.151  0.99 
     (435.82)  (0.48)  (2.92)       
U.K.   1952-1995  -441.43  0.222  0.260  0.077  0.99 
     (0.62)  (1.07)  (2.33)       
Ireland 1933-37,1953-94  -848.78  -0.352  0.322  0.120  0.83 
     (34.06)  (2.58)  (1.32)       
France 1925-35,1946-94  -42195.35  0.508  -0.939  0.461  0.87 
     (427.90)  (2.20)  (0.70)       
Finland   1958-1995  17902.24  0.218 1.199  0.198  0.99 
     (914.36)  (1.59)  (5.27)       
U.S. 1900-19,  1935-50  89.605  0.035  0.828  0.413  0.98 
     (2.98)  (0.18)  (4.10)       
U.S.   1950-1995  83.65  0.519  0.412  -0.246  0.98 
     (0.82)  (3.17)  (1.09)       
U.S. 1900-19,  1934-95  2.67  0.631  0.454  -0.045  0.96 
     (0.13)  (3.62)  (1.74)         
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Coefficients on age and sex variables suppressed.  For all but the U.S., the age variables used are 
the percentage of the population aged 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 
55-59, 60-64, and 65 and over (the percentage under 15 is omitted).  For the U.S., the age 
variables used are the percentage of the population aged 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 
and 65 and over (the percentage 0-4 is omitted).    
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Table 5: Regressions of Cirrhosis on Lagged Cirrhosis and Alcohol Consumption by 
Increasing/Decreasing, Age and Sex Variables Included 
         Test for whether 
Country Sample  Period  constant  cirrhosist-1 A t*Inc At*Dec   At*Inc=At*Dec R
2  
 
Australia   1958-95  1232.45  -0.302  0.699  0.683  2.54  0.98 
     (127.78)  (1.99)  (1.60)  (1.54)  0.1232   
Austria   1958-90  5754.00  0.235 -0.194 -0.110  3.78  0.92 
     (2.27)  (1.96)  (2.87)  (1.46)  0.0629   
Belgium    1958-93  39889.94 0.018 1.183  1.229  4.7  0.92 
      (1799.63) (0.12) (5.24)  (5.16)  0.0408   
Czech   1958-72  5340.79 -0.488  -0.106  -0.080 0.21  0.94 
     (0.92)  (1.47)  (0.96)  (0.78)  0.6487   
Denmark   1958-95  -47193.84  0.010  -0.013  0.010  0.42  0.94 
      (1038.95) (0.06) (0.02)  (0.02)  0.5248   
Hungary  1958-72  247881.71 0.534  -0.067  0.040  1.52  0.99 
     (656.23)  (4.26)  (0.44)  (0.24)  0.2297   
Italy   1958-95  687.39 0.848  -0.020  -0.033  0.24 0.98 
     (0.21)  (11.49)  (0.06)  (0.09)  0.6259   
Norway  1958-95  -15897.21 -0.131 1.528  1.455  0.95  0.79 
     (273.80)  (0.50)  (1.99)  (1.79)  0.3389   
Sweden   1958-95  -8305.59  0.193 2.445  2.510  2.07  0.98 
     (234.80)  (1.63)  (3.42)  (3.33)  0.1629   
Canada 1922-56,1958-95  -4080.31 -0.053  1.530  1.596  8.54  0.99 
     (790.94)  (0.36)  (4.88)  (4.94)  0.0063   
U.K.   1952-1995  -65.56 -0.037  0.347  0.375  2.37 0.99 
     (0.10)  (0.17)  (2.72)  (2.68)  0.1335   
Ireland 1933-37,1953-94  -4810.52 -0.259  -0.007 0.000  0.1  0.85 
     (209.11)  (2.18)  (0.12)  0.00    0.7522   
France 1925-35,1946-94  -42233.80  0.508  -0.940  -0.941 0  0.87 
     (416.91)  (2.18)  (0.71)  (0.72)  0.9931   
Finland   1958-1995  19853.24 0.141 1.322  1.361  1.04  0.99 
     (939.42)  (1.15)  (5.28)  (5.19)  0.3172   
U.S. 1900-19,  1935-50  90.476  0.076  0.553  0.566  0.14 0.97 
     (2.33)  (0.30)  (2.68)  (2.50)  0.7142   
U.S.   1950-1995  74.91  0.542  0.330  0.321  0.28 0.98 
     (0.71)  (3.15)  (0.70)  (0.67)  0.6016   
U.S. 1900-19,  1934-95  7.25  0.764  0.192  0.155  3.45 0.96 
     (0.38)  (4.11)  (1.14)  (0.90)  0.0677     
Newey-West (1987) t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
Coefficients on age and sex variables suppressed.  For all but the U.S., the age variables used are 
the percentage of the population aged 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 
55-59, 60-64, and 65 and over (the percentage under 15 is omitted).  For the U.S., the age 
variables used are the percentage of the population aged 5-14, 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 
and 65 and over (the percentage 0-4 is omitted).   
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Table 6: States Passing State Level Prohibitions before Federal Prohibition  
 
Before 1900  Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota 
 
1907 Georgia,  Oklahoma 
1908  Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina 
1909 Tennessee 
 
1912 West  Virginia 
 
1914  Arizona, Colorado, Oregon, Virginia, Washington 
1915  Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, South Carolina 
1916  Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota 
1917  Indiana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Utah 
1918  Florida, Nevada, Ohio, Wyoming 
1919 Kentucky,  Texas 
  
Note: New Hampshire repealed its 1855 prohibition in 1903.  Alabama repealed its 1908 
prohibition in 1911.   
 
Source: Wickersham, v.5 (1931, pp.640-641).  
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Table 7: Regressions of Cirrhosis on State Prohibition and Cirrhosis Rates by State, 







State Prohibition  0.238  0.307  -0.089 
 (0.72)  (3.38)  (1.26) 
      
Cirrhosist-1 0.675  0.728  0.884 
 (11.15)  (24.52)  (53.89) 
      
Constant 4.292  2.957  1.677 
 (5.16)  (7.85)  (3.73) 
      
Obs. 347  1749  4145 
      
R-squared 0.94  0.94  0.96 
 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.   
State fixed effects and year dummies included. 
Observations weighted by state population. 
 
% Decrease due to State Prohibitions   
1910-1920  -0.84% -1.17% 0.56% 
1920-1933   -10.24%  0.19% 
1933-1950   -0.77%  5.71% 
1950-1997    1.96% 
 
 
A negative entry indicates that state prohibitions increased cirrhosis. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Average Cirrhosis and Average Alcohol 
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Figure 2a: International Cirrhosis Death Rates and Alcohol Consumption per capita 
 






















































































































































































































































































Figure 2b: International Cirrhosis Death Rates and Alcohol Consumption per capita 
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